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THE U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
PARTNERSHIP: A DEBILITATING BLOW TO
THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
INTRODUCTION

I

n July of 2005, the United States and India announced their cooperative agreement on nuclear proliferation. Policy analysts see this development as a realpolitik move by the United States in balancing an
increasingly competitive China.1 As a legal matter, this agreement raises
compelling issues about the United States’ compliance with the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”)2 and India’s status as a legally
“unrecognized” nuclear weapons state (“NWS”).3 Interestingly, by the
terms of the NPT and pursuant to statutory law of the United States,
“non-nuclear weapon states” as recipients of nuclear transfers need not
be parties to the NPT or other arms control agreements.4 Under U.S. law,

1. George Perkovich, Policy Outlook: Faulty Promises, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Sept. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.carnegieendowment
.org/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf.
2. Multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]; see also United Nations [U.N.],
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.un.org/Depts/dda
/WMD/treaty (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). The U.N. explains that:
[t]he NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear
disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the
only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by
the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered
into force in 1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the Treaty, including the
five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any
other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s
significance.
Id.
3. Article IX of the NPT defines a nuclear weapon state (“NWS”) as one that had
“manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967.” NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. India conducted a “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974. See infra notes 66–80 and accompanying text.
4. Article IV(1) of the NPT recognizes the “inalienable right of all Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination. . . .” The pertinent portion of paragraph 2 reads,
Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing
alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, espe-
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pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the main requirement for
allowing nuclear exports is that the recipient state bring all its peaceful
nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)
safeguards.5 Even this requirement can be waived by a presidential determination that adhering to the policy would be “seriously prejudicial to
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security.”6 India was a beneficiary of
this exemption in the past and the proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement would, in effect, be a permanent exemption.7
Proponents of the agreement argue that it will enhance India’s compliance with non-proliferation in exchange for the promises of nuclear trade
liberalization between the two countries.8 Thus, the effects of this agree-

cially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with
due consideration for the needs of the developing world.
NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169 (emphasis added). This paragraph makes it clear that parties to the NPT can further nuclear development in non-party
states without violating the treaty particularly in light of the special allowance made for
non-NWS in the final clause. Id.
The United States echoes this policy in its statutory law. See Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978 § 203, 22 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006) (paragraph 1 expresses the need
to adopt principles and procedures in the event that a nation violates any “material obligation” with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear materials” and expressly distinguishes
NPT party states as a subset of those who would be eligible for peaceful use of nuclear
energy).
5. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (2006) (allowing for cooperation
with “non-nuclear weapon states” provided that they maintain International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) safeguards, discussed infra, on all nuclear materials in all peaceful activities within their territory). The IAEA was established in 1957 amidst growing
fears of a global nuclear war and took root in President Eisenhower’s famous “Atoms for
Peace” speech. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], About IAEA, http://
www.iaea.org/About/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). Currently, the IAEA promulgates standard “safeguards” that protect against the diversion of nuclear materials into
bomb-making uses:
The IAEA inspects nuclear and related facilities under safeguards agreements
with more than 140 States. Most agreements are with States that have internationally committed themselves not to possess nuclear weapons. They are concluded pursuant to the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), for which the IAEA is the verification authority.
IAEA, Our Work, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/index.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2008).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (a)(9).
7. India’s past exemption is discussed infra in Part I.
8. Hearing on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative: Prepared Remarks
before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Robert G. Jo-
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ment can be cast in a light that heralds the addition of a major nuclear
weapons state into the broader non-proliferation regime.9 Conversely, the
agreement can be construed as a threat to the already weak international
ordering of nuclear non-proliferation given that India is not a signatory to
the NPT and therefore does not bear the same international obligations
that were undertaken by the five recognized nuclear weapons states
(“NWS”).10
Part I of this Note will examine the terms of the India-U.S. nuclear deal
and consider potential obstacles to implementing the terms in light of
existing IAEA safeguards. The analysis will employ the theory of international regimes, which envisions states developing “shared expectations
of behavior” that lead to “consistent practices converging around specific
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.”11 Adopting
the regime theory as a model, this Note argues that India’s behavioral
patterns in the nuclear-proliferation arena have demonstrated its unwillingness to share in the principles embraced by the non-proliferation regime and therefore the U.S.-India agreement is a premature liberalization
of nuclear-trade when it is not remotely apparent that India intends to
commit itself to the ambitious goals of the NPT.
Second, because the agreement is a bilateral measure between India
and the United States that stands apart from the multilateral nonproliferation community, the enforceability of treaties and agreements
within that regime will become severely undermined if due care is not
taken to assure the remainder of states that those agreements still reflect
the policy goals common to the major NWS. Specifically, Part II will
emphasize the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(“ABMT”) 12 and its failure to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban
seph, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., Dep’t of State), available at http://
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/55968.htm.
9. “Most recognize the need to come to terms with India and not to allow it to remain completely outside the international non-proliferation system.” Id.
10. The big five NWS are: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and
China. One such obligation common to all NWS is the cessation of production of fissile
materials (discussed infra) for weapons purposes. Perkovich, supra note 1, at 8.
11. Edward M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1592 (1991) (discussing the utility of international regime theory and domestic relational theory to supplement existing consent-based rules
with the hope of understanding state compliance with/defection from evolving international obligations).
12. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May
26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABMT] (bilateral treaty limiting the United States
and Soviet Union from employing missile defense systems that would spur on their offensive weapons race discussed in detail infra Part II).
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Treaty (“CTBT”).13 It will also highlight India’s conspicuous rejection of
all relevant multilateral nuclear arms instruments. In light of these two
behavioral patterns, the U.S.-India partnership is a stark rejection by both
states of international customary law that embraces the brokering of nuclear-weapons-free zones (“NWFZs”) and multi-lateral disarmament
measures.14 Part II of this Note will utilize Professor Thomas M.
Franck’s15 theory of legitimacy among nations to argue that the liberalization of nuclear trade between the two states has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of existing multilateral nuclear-weapons free zones
in two distinct ways: 1) by establishing a practice that is inconsistent
with and rationally unexceptionable from the customary practice of states
entering multilateral agreements on non-proliferation, hence undermining the regime’s coherence16 and 2) by contravening the expectations of
13. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
1439 [hereinafter CTBT] (multilateral treaty banning the testing of any nuclear explosive
device yet to enter into force due to its strict entry-into-force provision discussed in detail
infra Part II).
14. The nuclear-weapons-free zones (“NWFZs”) discussed in this Note are not representative of all such agreements now in existence. In addition to the 1968 Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 6
I.L.M. 521 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] and the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Treaty of
Rarotonga] (discussed in Part II infra), the following treaties have established NWFZs:
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 1961 WL 62657 (U.S. is a party and has
ratified, India has acceded); Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,
opened for signature Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635 (entered into force 1997 after ratifications by Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Protocol inviting a non-use promise of
nuclear weapons against states party to the treaty has not been signed or ratified by any of
the five official NWS); African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature
Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698 (conducted under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”), this treaty will enter into force upon the deposit of the twenty-eighth
instrument). As of November 2005, there were twenty ratifications and the United States
has signed but not ratified the non-use Protocol. See List of Countries That Have Signed,
Ratified/Acceded to the African NWFZ Treaty, http://www.africaunion.org/Official_
documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/List/Pelindaba%20Treaty.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2008). For recent updates on the status of various NWFZs, see Agency
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,
http://www.opanal.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
15. Thomas Franck is considered one of the leading scholars in international legal
theory and is a Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus at New York University. New York University Faculty Profiles, http://its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/
index.cfm?fuseaction=bio.main&personID=19925 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
16. “[W]hen states do not act consistently, no principle of general application appears
on the surface of what looks like an erratic pattern of conduct. States may thus conclude
that there is, and can be, no legitimate rule to command their adherence.” THOMAS M.
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states party to such agreements, bringing into question the determinacy
of rules that structure relationships between NPT and non-NPT signatories, and ultimately decreasing the non-proliferation regime’s “compliance-pull.”17
Third, the U.S.-India agreement must be read in the context of the yetto-be-resolved conflict between India and its bitter rival, Pakistan.18 In
the context of the current agreement, because Pakistan is likewise a nonsignatory of any international non-proliferation treaties and China is
widely recognized as having furthered proliferation in Pakistan, there is
no reason to believe that a similar cooperative agreement could not
emerge between Pakistan and China to balance the U.S-India alignment.19 Alternatively, even if such a formal agreement were implausible,
the very existence of a U.S.-India partnership gives Pakistan a substantial
incentive to surreptitiously pursue illicit proliferation measures to assuage its security concerns.20 This would certainly not be uncharacteristic
of Pakistani behavior in the realm of nuclear arms given that the Pakistani government infamously enabled A.Q. Khan to engineer his illicit
nuclear arms smuggling ring.21 Part III of this Note will analyze the U.S.India agreement through the lens of the game theory model, the pris-

FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 174 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990)
(explaining that coherent application of a rule plays a vital role in shaping perceptions of
the rule’s legitimacy).
17. Id. at 42–43.
18. The animosity between the two states dates back to the Partition of 1947 following the British withdrawal from its colonial seat, which divided the sub-continent into the
Islamic Nation of Pakistan and a secular India. This Note will not delve into the details of
Indo-Pakistani tensions but rather highlight the imprudence of the U.S.-India nuclear
partnership in light of this regional dilemma. See India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations,
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_
Pakistan/timeline/default.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) (providing a brief timeline that
describes the above stated events in more detail).
19. In fact, certain technology transfers between China and Pakistan may very well
already be “grandfathered in” as a response to the U.S.-India partnership. See discussion
infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text.
20. Indo-Asian News Service, Pakistan Nuclear Authority Concerned Over US-India
Deal, YAHOO! INDIA NEWS, Apr. 12, 2006, http://in.news.yahoo.com/060412/43/
63i3u.html. See also Seema Sridhar, India-US Defence Agreement: Impact on Indo-Pak
Peace Process, INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, July 28, 2005, http://
www.ipcs.org/Pak_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1817&country=1016&statu
s=article&mod=a.
21. Commander Kevin M. Brew, The Re-Emergence of Nuclear Weapons as “The
Coin of The Realm” and the Return of Nuclear Brinkmanship in South Asia: The Nuclear
Sword of Damocles Still Hangs by a Thread, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 177, 191–92 (2005).
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oner’s dilemma.22 In this context, the primary players are India and Pakistan, regional nuclear rivals who have clashed in several wars over the
past five decades and maintained low-level conflict across their shared
border in the state of Kashmir. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both players
have an offensive incentive to defect from any agreement or understanding that intends to avoid escalation or rekindling of conflict.23 Therefore,
given this backdrop in the sub-continent, an agreement that aligns India’s
security interests with that of the United States can only exacerbate Pakistan’s defensive incentives. Any half-hearted efforts to secure assurances
from Pakistan that it will place a moratorium on production of fissile material24 for nuclear weapons “would be foolhardy” given that states with
an offensive incentive to defect have the concomitant incentive to mislead others about their compliance.25 Thus, assurances are unsatisfactory
substitutes to fill the void of international legal instruments governing
weapons proliferation in the sub-continent.
Finally, this Note concludes that the U.S.-India agreement stands in
stark contradiction to the international interests in non-proliferation, let
alone disarmament. That is, the weaknesses of IAEA safeguards, particularly in the verification and enforcement respects, coupled with the precarious state of international non-proliferation instruments as affected by
the conduct of the United States, taken in light of the regional security
dilemma enmeshed in the South Asian sub-continent promise that the
U.S.-India nuclear deal will, over time, undo what little progress has
been made in this intractable field of international law.
I. THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
On July 27, 2006, the United States House of Representatives supported the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
22. In this model, the players are confronted with a collective action problem in
which no player can be sure what course of action the other players will take and unilateral defection from the collective purpose can produce the greatest individual benefits.
Arms control presents precisely such a predicament. See discussion infra notes 181–204
and accompanying text. For more on game theory as applied to arms control, see Kenneth
W. Abbott, “Trust but Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties
and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1993).
23. Id. at 26.
24. Fissile material refers to the substance that results when uranium is highly enriched or plutonium is separated from the spent nuclear fuel. Both forms are used to produce nuclear weapons. See Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Fissile Material Basics, http://www.ieer.org/fctsheet/fm_basic.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
25. Abbot, supra note 22. Regarding U.S. policy objectives related to Pakistan and
the U.S.-India nuclear deal, see United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation
Act of 2006, H.R. 5682, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006).
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Cooperation Act (“the Act”) by a majority of 359 to 68.26 On November
16, 2006, the Senate passed the bill with several amendments; the overall
effect of the act is to waive restrictions under the aforementioned 1954
Atomic Energy Act27 and exempt India from applying full-scope safeguards (“FSS”) on all its nuclear facilities.28 The significant bipartisan
support this bill has enjoyed can, in part, be explained by the prospect
that the contemplated partnership is slated to generate $100 billion in
energy sales for U.S. companies.29
At this juncture it would be beneficial to clarify the legal standing of
the partnership that the Act envisions. The agreement is not a treaty but
rather a “strategic partnership.”30 In order for the agreement’s terms (discussed in greater detail below) to be carried out, the United States must
first amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act excepting India from full-scope
safeguard restrictions.31 This has virtually been accomplished as the bill
awaits the President’s signature. Once amended, the United States and
India would enter into what is known as a “123 cooperative agreement”
under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which would embody the
actual terms of the deal.32 Even after domestic legislation is amended, the
26. Lea Terhune, U.S. House of Representatives Approves U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, July 27, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?
p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=July&x=20060727121049mlenuhret3.629702e-02. See
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, H.R. 5682, 109th Cong.
(2d. Sess. 2006).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2153.
28. Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 22
U.S.C. § 8003 (2006). The bill was co-sponsored by a bipartisan contingency comprised
of twelve Democrats and twenty-two Republicans. United States-India Peaceful Atomic
Energy Cooperation Act 2006, Bill Tracking H.R. 5682, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006).
29. Judy Mathewson, U.S.-India Nuclear Deal May Stall in Congress as Time Runs
Out, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20
Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/2006/926200693510AM.html#2G.
30. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: United States and India: Strategic Partnership, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/2006030213.html; Telephone Interview with Katherine Schultz, India Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State,
in Washington, D.C., [hereinafter Shultz Interview] (Nov. 9, 2006).
31. Schultz Interview, supra note 30.
32. Id. Schultz expressed that the agreement would not be a promise of unrestricted
trade in nuclear technology. This suggests the agreement is less than a binding exchange
of promises but rather an exchange of conditional assurances. The danger in this arrangement is if India is found to be non-compliant with the terms and the United States
suspends or terminates performance under section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, India
could argue that its facilities are no longer legally bound to IAEA safeguards. This fear
was prevalent during the previous U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement that supplied
technology to the Tarapur reactors, discussed infra notes 67–80 and accompanying text).
See also Atomic Energy Act § 129.
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Nuclear Suppliers Group (“NSG”), a forty-five state consortium dedicated to the cessation of the spread of nuclear weapons would have to
unanimously agree to except India from its policy proscribing transfers
of atomic fuel and other nuclear technologies to states that are not party
to the NPT or other non-proliferation instruments and have not adopted
FSS.33
While the likelihood of the NSG enthusiastically approving this
agreement is debatable, 34 there is an unquestionable need for solemn
reflection on the partnership’s legal implications for the non-proliferation
regime. According to Esther Pan of the Council on Foreign Relations, the
agreement consists of the following terms:
1. India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog group,
access to its civilian nuclear program. But India would decide which of
its many nuclear facilities to classify as civilian. . . . Teresita Schaffer,
director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says these will now include domestically built
plants, which India has not been willing to safeguard before now. Military facilities—and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced
up to now—will be exempt from inspections or safeguards.
2. India commits to signing an Additional Protocol—which allows
more intrusive IAEA inspections—of its civilian facilities.
3. India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
4. India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals.
5. India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
(FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don’t possess
them and to support international non-proliferation efforts.

33. Schultz Interview, supra note 30. To reiterate, full-scope safeguards (“FSS”) signify the oversight of the IAEA on all peaceful nuclear activities of a state and obtain the
result of monitoring the use of spent nuclear fuel to ensure that it is not being diverted for
weapons production. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Communications
Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment and Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1, Mar. 2006, at para. 4.
The application of FSS to all of a state’s peaceful nuclear activities is effective when
applied to non-nuclear weapon states because all of their nuclear capability is presumptively non-military. Because India already has nuclear weapons capability, FSS will not
achieve the comprehensive oversight it is designed to impose.
34. See discussion infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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6. U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and
provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program. 35

A. Weaknesses Inherent in the IAEA Structure Will Carry Over to the
U.S.-India Deal
The first term, which allows India to select the facilities that will be
subject to safeguards, bespeaks of the limitations inherent in the nuclear
arrangement that India and the U.S. seek to consummate. Given that the
application of IAEA safeguards is predicated on a state’s declaration of
what is and is not a civilian (as opposed to military) facility, the declaration is unrepresentative of a state’s actual production and use of nuclear
materials, namely any use directed at weapons production.36 This distinction between “civilian” and “military” facilities is embedded in the architecture of the IAEA and applies to all the recognized NWS, thereby entitling them to harbor un-safeguarded military facilities; this is, in effect,
the regime’s deference to each NWS state’s sovereign right to selfdefense.37 While India is not bound by the NPT, the joint statement issued by the United States and India committed India “to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such
as the United States.”38 Assuming that the NPT’s underlying obligations
can be extended to India by association, the safeguard provisions applicable to contracting parties of the NPT themselves offer significant allowances that exempt certain nuclear material from the IAEA’s vigil.
Paragraphs 14 and 37 of the IAEA’s guidelines for safeguarding agree35. Esther Pan, The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal¸ Backgrounder, Council on Foreign
Relations, Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/usindia_nuclear_deal.html
#2.
36. In other words, classifying certain facilities as civilian and excluding others necessarily means that India intends to retain exclusive and opaque control over its military
uses for nuclear materials. As mentioned supra at note 24, spent nuclear fuel can yield
plutonium, which can then be used to produce nuclear weapons. Having thus far operated
its facilities largely beyond the reach of international oversight, Esther Pan suggests that
India has already accumulated significant amounts of weapons-grade material not subject
to any safeguards on its future use. Pan, supra note 35.
37. “The safeguards system comprises measures by which the Agency independently
verifies the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities.”
IAEA, About Safeguards, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/about.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2008). However, the scope of the IAEA’s duty only ensures safeguards
on all of a contracting state’s nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear activities. IAEA,
The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, at 2, http://
www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
38. Press Release, India-U.S. Joint Statement, EMBASSY OF INDIA, July 18, 2005,
http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/July/21.htm.
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ments allow for exemptions from safeguards at the discretionary request
of a state.39 Paragraph 37 imposes certain quantitative limitations on exempted nuclear materials and parties to the Additional Protocol40 must
declare the amounts, locations, and uses of such materials.41

39. Paragraph 14 reads:
The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion
to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the
Agreement, the following procedures will apply:
a. The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
i. That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military
activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have
given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and
ii. That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices;
b. The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the
nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the
Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent
possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again
apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition
of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such
material; and
c. Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. The
Agency’s agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate
to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but
shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity
or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.
The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Unofficial
version INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) June 1972 [hereinafter IAEA Structure and Content]
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index.html (last visited
Mar 10, 2008) (emphasis in original).
40. The Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, under article 5,
requires party states to provide the agency with access to “any place on a site” where the
word “site,” under article 18, is defined as the location of an active or decommissioned
civilian facility and any adjacent locations where nuclear materials are used or locations
that are essential to serving nuclear facilities. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), International Atomic Energy Agency

2008]

U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIP

729

By allowing a state to temporarily exempt certain materials from safeguarding and acknowledging that these materials could be diverted for
“non-proscribed” military purposes, the IAEA has effectively provided
every state with a loophole that could be used to legitimize activities that
may in fact be directed towards weapons proliferation. This is not to say
that the safeguarding system is completely impotent in carrying out its
mandate. By requiring states to declare the amounts and locations of nuclear fuel circulating in their civilian facilities and allowing for intrusive
inspections, the IAEA has provided for means to confirm the accuracy as
well as completeness of a state’s representations.42 Signatories of the Additional Protocol must, pursuant to article 5, provide the IAEA with access to sites containing safeguard-exempt material or, where access is not
forthcoming, must make other reasonable efforts to fulfill IAEA requirements.43
B. Insufficient Attention Has Been Paid to the Legal Implications of a
Stand-Alone Bilateral Agreement between India and the United States
For U.S. lawmakers and the administration, India’s good standing in
the international community, which it has earned over the years, informs
the decision to promote the cooperative agreement.44 While this is not an
invalid starting point, advocates of the partnership pay insufficient credence and respect to the legal implications of a stand-alone bilateral
agreement with the United States that subjects India’s activities to IAEA
safeguards versus obligations it would have as a party to the NPT. At
first glance, one might argue that, by accepting IAEA safeguards, India
has essentially been allowed in as a de facto NPT state and therefore is
under the same obligations as other NWS parties. A closer comparison
between the provisions of the NPT and the model safeguards agreement
reveals that under a stand-alone bilateral agreement, the United States
and India have left room for significant divergences from non-

available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/index.html [hereinafter IAEA
Additional Model Protocol] (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
41. Id. at art. 2 (vii)(a) & (b).
42. According to the Agency, “completeness” was a factor that did not become of
great concern until the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine weapons program. See IAEA, The
Safeguards System of the International Atomic Agency, supra note 37, at 4.
43. IAEA Additional Model Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 5.
44. See Hearing on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, supra note 8
(“India has clearly demonstrated over the past several years its desire to work with the
United States and the international community to fight the spread of sensitive nuclear
technologies.”)
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proliferation goals to the prejudice of the control regimes and other parties to the NPT.
Article I of the NPT reads,
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
or control over such weapons or explosive devices.45

A strict constructionist interpretation of this provision would support a
strong argument that the agreement can potentially bring the United
States in violation of article I. As mentioned above, India is to this day,
under the terms of the NPT, a “non-nuclear weapons state” since, under
article IX, it did not explode a device until after January 1, 1967. If technologies acquired by India through its liberalized relationship with the
United States are diverted to support its existing weapons systems or to
enhance aspects thereof, the United States would be in direct violation of
article I. Since nothing in the agreement indicates that India has committed to an explicit cessation of any and all development of nuclear weapons technology, such a scenario is well within the realm of probability.46
Given the broad language of the prohibition, one could even argue that a
Pakistan that is threatened by the U.S.-India alignment could be “induced
indirectly” by the United States to proliferate nuclear weapons in order to
increase its deterrence level. This would also be a violation of article I of
the NPT.
An even more probable difficulty that could arise is the issue relating
to transfers/retransfers of technology. When considering this topic, four
bodies of law are relevant to the discussion: the NPT, the IAEA safeguards agreement, and the domestic export laws of the United States and
India. As discussed above, article I of the NPT adopts broad language
that prohibits a state from transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear
devices both directly or indirectly and prohibits “inducing” a state to acquire the same. India, as a non-party to this treaty, would not be bound
by this provision. Therefore the remaining bodies of law governing its

45. NPT, supra note 2, U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166.
46. In fact, part of the agreement is to pursue cooperation on issues of national security and defense. See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: United States and India:
Strategic Partnership, supra note 30 (“The United States reaffirmed its goal to help meet
India’s defense needs and to provide the important technologies and capabilities that
India seeks.”).
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transfer are limited to the IAEA safeguards and provisions in U.S. and
Indian export laws.
A careful scrutiny of the requirements governing transfers under the
IAEA safeguards agreement indicates that the agency exercises only a
post-hoc review capacity over transfer agreements between a safeguarded state and a receiving state. Paragraph 92 of the IAEA document,
which promulgates requirements for safeguard agreements, reads:
The Agreement should provide that any intended transfer out of the
State of safeguarded nuclear material in an amount exceeding one effective kilogram, or by successive shipments to the same State within a
period of three months each of less than one effective kilogram but exceeding in total one effective kilogram, shall be notified to the Agency
after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the
transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is
to be prepared for shipping.47

This provision clearly adopts a deferential approach to interstate transactions in nuclear materials given that it allows for the fruition of a contract before any notice is required from a state of its intentions to transfer
sensitive safeguarded materials. What is more, it only allows a two week
window between time of notice and delivery of such materials, within
which the IAEA may take actions only to confirm the amounts of nuclear
material being shipped and its destinations.48 Furthermore, and in perhaps its most prostrate and submissive statement, the IAEA qualifies its
oversight duties with this: “However, the transfer of the nuclear material
shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by
the Agency pursuant to this notification.”49 If a contractual relationship
comes into being and the transferor gives only two weeks notice to the
relevant “authority” regarding the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials,
it defies reason to maintain that the IAEA has any preventive value if it
cannot stay or abate what it deems an unsafe transfer of nuclear materials. Lastly, it should not come as a surprise that a state subject to a safeguard agreement is not obligated to ensure that a recipient state of its
transfers adheres to or is also subject to IAEA safeguards.50 All that is
required is that the receiving state notifies the IAEA of the successful
receipt of the materials declared to have been transferred by the state of
origin.51
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

IAEA Structure and Content, supra note 42 (emphasis in original).
Id. at para. 93.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at para 94.
Id.

732

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:2

In light of this apparent shortcoming of the agency’s oversight and review capacity, one is forced to turn to each country’s domestic export
laws to find a more rigid review mechanism. However, if this is conceded as the only reliable means of oversight, it is also conceded that
each country is entitled to make its own authoritative interpretation of
NPT article I, regardless of whether it is consistent with the NPT’s goals
of non-proliferation. Each country may interpret what constitutes “direct” or “indirect” transfers, whether its actions truly “assist, encourage
or induce” another to acquire nuclear weapons, or even what constitutes
the “manufacture” and “acquisition” of nuclear weapons. As troubling as
this observation may be, whatever semblance of authority the NPT does
retain would be squandered if India were allowed to “end-run” the
treaty’s obligations and only needed to commit to select safeguards under
the IAEA. In pursuing this policy initiative, the United States has tacitly
rebuffed the NPT’s relevance to non-proliferation goals, thereby undermining the regime’s capability to foster “shared expectations of behavior” between states and increasing the likelihood of states acting unilaterally to thwart its overall vision.52
C. The U.S.-India Agreement is a Premature Liberalization of Nuclear
Trade When it is not Remotely Apparent that India Intends to Commit
Itself to the Ambitious Goals of the NPT Regime
Despite its weaknesses, the NPT’s strength as an international legal institution derives from the widespread deference it has obtained through
its ratification by 187 countries that have accepted its ambitious goals of
non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.53
Inconsistencies in practice amounting to non-compliance do not necessitate a finding that the regime lacks legal significance.54 However, when a
state stands apart from the NPT, rejects its very architecture but nevertheless leverages the regime’s visions of peaceful nuclear use to obtain
materials essential to the production of nuclear weapons, one can conclude that a widely shared sense of obligation to pursue non-proliferation
is not extant in the minds of Indian policymakers.

52. Smith, supra note 11, at 1592.
53. These goals are often referred to as the “three pillars” of the NPT. See United
Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2; FRIEDRICH
V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND
LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 62–63 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1989). For data of number of NPT ratifications, see United Nations, Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2.
54. Smith, supra note 11, at 1589.
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In the October 1998 issue of Foreign Affairs, Jaswant Singh, Senior
Adviser on Defense and Foreign Affairs to then Indian Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee published an article defending India’s May 1998
nuclear tests. The tests had shocked the world and ushered in India as a
de facto nuclear-weapons state. In explicating India’s security dilemma,
Mr. Singh essentially asserted India’s sovereign right to employ nuclear
weapons as a means to secure its national interests just as the existing
five NWS had done.55 However, this assertion was grounded in a much
broader assessment of the state of nuclear weapons:
The Americas are under the U.S. nuclear deterrent as members of the
Organization of American States. South Korea, Japan, and Australasia
are also under the U.S. umbrella. China is, of course, a major nuclear
power. Only Africa and southern Asia remain outside this new international nuclear paradigm where nuclear weapons and their role in international conduct are paradoxically legitimized. These differentiated
standards of national security–a sort of international nuclear apartheid–
are not simply a challenge to India but demonstrate the inequality of the
entire non-proliferation regime.56

Speaking for the entire sub-continent and the continent of Africa, Mr.
Singh articulates a dangerous proposition that any state not under a nuclear “umbrella” may rightfully assert its entitlement to acquire nuclearweapons capability. While this position is defensible under a strict positivist construction of statehood and security, the fact that South Asian
countries such as Nepal and several African countries such as Cameroon
and Zimbabwe have ratified the treaty indicates that “unsheltered” states
feel obliged to defer to the collective decision that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is inimical to international peace and security.57 That is,
under international regime theory, the legitimacy and strength of a regime results from the “deference to authoritative decisions that establish[] what ‘the law’ is, or from the acceptance of norm-regulated practice.”58 In the case of the NPT, the fact that 187 states have ratified the
treaty and are bound by its provisions is indicative of an institution that
55. Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept-Oct. 1998
available at http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/js/js(foreignaffairs).html. The fact that
this article is still available on the Indian Embassy’s Web site is itself an indication of
India’s adherence to its position justifying its 1998 tests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102(2), cmt. b (1987) (The article’s
availability can be construed as a diplomatic act that constitutes practice indicating its
unilateral legal stance on nuclear weapons.).
56. Id.
57. See NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 484, 729 U.N.T.S. at 162.
58. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 53, at 62–63 (emphasis in original).
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induces the “acceptance of decisions as authoritative . . . which have
been made collectively.”59 Absent an unequivocal assent by India to the
preeminent instrument governing nuclear non-proliferation or active efforts to ensure regional disarmament, a mere promise to “commit to play
a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction” seems to ring hollow.60
The third pillar of the NPT, peaceful use, is expressed in article IV,
which recognizes the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes . . . .”61 Paragraph 2 provides for parties to “undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”62 The second sentence of paragraph 2
places an explicit onus on what can most readily be construed as the
NWS to further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy with an
eye towards the needs of the developing areas of the world.63 The striking aspect of this paragraph is that it encourages cooperation, initiated
unilaterally or otherwise, between parties to the treaty and “States or international organizations” to further develop the application of peaceful
nuclear energy.64 This broad language leaves open the option for an NPT
state to engage a non-NPT state in the exchange of nuclear technology.
However, an NPT state that does enter such a relationship, under article
III of the NPT, must ensure that any such transfer subjects the materials
to IAEA FSS.65 Therefore, strictly speaking, even if India’s conduct is
consistent with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the U.S.-India
Agreement violates the NPT on its face given the inevitable absence of

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Press Release, India-U.S. Joint Statement, supra note 38.
NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169.
Id.
Paragraph 2 in its entirety reads:

All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties
to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or
together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in
the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Id.
64. Id.
65. NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 168.
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FSS on India’s military nuclear facilities. Even where applicable, the
IAEA safeguards, as already discussed, are less than satisfactory in their
verification methods. This leaves one to search for a more robust verification scheme enmeshed in the agreements made pursuant to article IV.
The United States has been down this road before with India. On August 8, 1963, the United States and India entered into the Agreement for
Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States
and India.66 The agreement was reached to facilitate the construction of a
civil nuclear power plant near Tarapur in the state of Maharashtra.67 The
agreement would last for thirty years and would provide India with sales
of
all requirements of the Government of India for enriched uranium for
use as fuel at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, it being understood
that the Tarapur Atomic Power Station shall be operated on no other
special nuclear material than that made available by the United States
Commission and special nuclear material produced therefrom.68

During the period of this agreement, India and the United States encountered several key disputes over the interpretation of the agreement’s
term and scope of limitations on expiration.69 India asserted the right to
use plutonium, the spent fuel from the reactors, for military purposes
upon expiration of the thirty year term.70 Furthermore, it asserted a right
to extract spent plutonium during the term of the agreement without regard for the requirement of U.S. approved safeguards authorizing such
action under article VI of the agreement.71 These arguments were indicative of India’s intention to divert uranium (which can become explosive
when it is highly enriched or when it is converted to plutonium by irradiation) acquired from the Tarapur agreement to its very active nuclear
weapons program.72 In fact, after India tested its first “peaceful” nuclear
explosive in 1974, it became clear that U.S. supplied heavy water73 had
66. India Atomic Energy: Cooperation for Civil Uses, U.S.-India, Aug. 8, 1963, 14
U.S.T. 1484 [hereinafter Tarapur Agreement].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 593, 594 (1987).
70. Id.
71. Tarapur Agreement, supra note 66, 14 U.S.T. at 1494; Milhollin, supra note 69,
at 598.
72. Milhollin, supra note 69, at 594.
73. Heavy water is involved in an alternative method that can be used to produce
plutonium from uranium without the need for any enrichment of uranium. See Federation
of American Scientists, Heavy Water Production, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/
heavy.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
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contributed to the successful test.74 Even after this apparent failure of
non-proliferation policy and despite its right to suspend or terminate the
agreement “[i]n the event of noncompliance with the guarantees”
therein,75 the United States resolved to stay engaged with India on the
Tarapur issue in the fear that “denial of [performance] . . . would free
India from existing safeguards on the Tarapur atomic reactor.”76
While there are difficult policy choices to consider when making such
decisions, the legal implications of a state’s interactions with regimes
that govern areas of crucial and common international interest demand a
heightened level of scrutiny. The foregoing discussion has pointed to
India’s historic rejection of the NPT’s architecture and its behavior in
engaging an NPT state, the United States, in order to acquire nuclear materials and ultimately subvert non-proliferation principles. One is
unlikely to conclude that India has made any significant overtures that
indicate that it embraces the goals of the NPT and the means the regime
employs to achieve them.77 Therefore, an agreement between the United
States and India cannot reasonably be said to further the development of
“shared expectations of behavior” that are consistent with the NPT.78 In
fact, while instances of non-compliance and deviations from the rules
and decision-making procedures may actually further embed the regime’s legal obligations given their adaptive flexibility, “substantial
modification of the principles and norms of a regime reveals fundamental
variations posing risks to the continuation of the regime.”79 Engaging
India, given its stance regarding the NPT, clearly falls within the latter
class of deviations where India’s position against the NPT is emboldened
now that it has a major NPT-NWS state’s seal of approval.

74. Milhollin, supra note 69, at 595. See also Tahirih V. Lee, The Effect of Chadha on
the Creation of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: The United States-China Agreement
on Nuclear Energy, 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 73, 92 (1987).
75. Tarapur Agreement, supra note 66, 14 U.S.T. at 1494.
76. Lee, supra note 74, at 94 (discussing President Carter’s decision to approve an
export license for a shipment of uranium to India, informed by concerns of unsafeguarded facilities and the geopolitics of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, amidst Senate resolutions expressing disapproval of the shipment).
77. There are instances of Indian policy with respect to nuclear non-proliferation that
could be argued to bring it within the scope of the international non-proliferation regime’s principles. See discussion infra note 206 and accompanying text.
78. Smith, supra note 11, at 1592.
79. Id. at 1593 (citing Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2, 2 (S. Krasner ed. 1983)).
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II. THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP: AN AFFRONT TO MULTILATERALISM
The U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative is essentially being undertaken without the blessing of the multilateral non-proliferation regime. What this means for the future of the regime can be ascertained
through an analysis of Thomas M. Franck’s theory of legitimacy and traditional models.80 On the one hand, the initiative can be construed as a
defection by the United States from the principles of the nonproliferation regime that ultimately derogates from the regime’s capacity
to obligate.81 On the other hand, if the United States argues that this initiative is consistent with the goals of the non-proliferation regime (which
it fervently has)82 then the regime’s legitimacy is nevertheless dealt a
blow, this time by an undermining of its determinacy.83 In other words,
this would signal to the remaining states, especially those with considerable access to nuclear technologies, that reaching similar arrangements
with non-NPT signatories would be acceptable behavior under the nonproliferation regime. In either case, the consequences are the same: states
will be induced into behavior that threatens to increase the likelihood of
nuclear weapons proliferation.
In order to proceed with this line of analysis, it is first necessary to establish that the non-proliferation regime embodies rules that govern state
practice. It is a basic tenet of international law that a practice generally
followed by states out of a sense of legal obligation gives rise to customary international law, which is binding on all states.84 The term “practice” contemplates diplomatic acts, statements of policy, or even inaction
of a state in the face of outside-state behavior that may affect its legal
rights.85 Therefore, the signing of international instruments itself can
contribute to the crystallization of customary rules of international law.86
80. FRANCK, supra note 16.
81. Franck argues that disobedience of a rule does not necessarily terminate its ability
to obligate but repeated instances of disobedience can yield an atmosphere that renders
defection from the rule acceptable, thereby threatening the rule’s demise. Id. at 44.
82. See discussion infra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
83. Determinacy, according to Franck, is roughly synonymous with “textual clarity,”
in that it gives states precise prescriptions on how to conduct themselves. FRANCK, supra
note 16, at 52.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
102(1)(a), cmts. b, c (1987). Under comment d, a state that expresses dissent during the
principle’s development will not be bound by the custom. Therefore, it can be said that
India, having refused to sign the NPT from its inception, demonstrated its dissent from
any customary law that may have developed obligating states to refrain from weapons
proliferation. Id. at § 102(1)(a), cmt. d.
85. Id.
86. Id. at § 102(1)(a), cmt. i.
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In this vein, it is a testament to the existence of a customary law that 187
countries have ratified the NPT, making it the most widely accepted arms
limiting or disarmament instrument in history.87
Second, the existence of nuclear weapons-free zones, test bans, and
other non-proliferation treaties, virtually all of which are codified in multilateral instruments, further buttresses the proposition that there exists an
obligation to pursue non-proliferation methods consistent with the existing regime’s practice under customary international law.88 Third, the legitimacy of the regime is underscored when one examines the nuclear
weapons control issue as a classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma
(“PD”). In this game theory model, the players are confronted with a collective action problem in which no player can be sure what course of action the other players will take and unilateral defection from the collective purpose can produce the greatest individual benefits. Arms control
presents precisely such a predicament.89 However, despite the strong pull
of non-compliance in this context, 182 non-nuclear weapons states have
signed the NPT and those with nuclear programs have submitted to fullscope safeguards on all their nuclear energy facilities.90 This fact alone
illustrates the degree of legitimacy the non-proliferation regime has attained notwithstanding its aforementioned shortcomings. When states
forgo short-term strategic advantages while paying deference to longterm “communitarian interests,” it evinces a collective desire to see the
regime’s rules reinforced.91 A corollary of this principle is that a defecting state will be regarded a threat to the long-term interests of other
states.92

87. United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note
2.
88. In furtherance of this goal, the decision of the International Court of Justice in the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons recognized the existence of an obligation of all states under customary international law to pursue disarmament in good faith.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226,
265–67 (Jul. 8).
89. Abbott, supra note 22, at 8.
90. See Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, supra note 33, at
para. 4.
91. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 57.
92. Id. at 150–51.

2008]

U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIP

739

A. The U.S.-India Deal Represents a Rejection of Multilateralism as an
Effective Means to Further Non-Proliferation that Threatens the Regime’s Legitimacy
Although the purported interests of both India and the United States in
entering this agreement are to further the goals of non-proliferation,93 the
means they have undertaken stand in stark contrast to and are incoherent
with the multilateral approach that is embraced by the remainder of the
non-proliferation regime. Franck posits that a rule’s legitimacy depends,
in part, on the coherence with which it is pursued by the states subscribing to its authority.94 Consequently, inconsistent application of a rule by
states should be rationally distinguishable as exceptions that do not detract from its overall coherence.95 Therefore, if one accepts the assertion
that multilateral international agreements represent the customary expression of non-proliferation policies, a bilateral agreement with a nonnuclear weapons state must conform to the custom at least to a degree
that can be considered not incoherent with the regime’s rules. Alternatively, some rational explanation should distinguish the agreement so as
to maintain the coherence of the multilateral regime’s rule. This cannot
be said of the partnership between the United States and India.
To better understand the primacy of multilateralism in the nonproliferation regime, it would be helpful to survey four landmark agreements and, where applicable, discuss the conduct of the United States
and India in each respective context:
1. Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco 96
The Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first nuclear-weapons-free
zone (“NWFZ”), which recognized that “militarily denuclearized zones
are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and
complete disarmament at a later stage . . . .”97 Under article 1 of the
agreement, parties undertake to use nuclear material and facilities solely
for peaceful purposes and are under an affirmative duty to prohibit and
prevent the manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, or deployment of such weapons, “directly or indirectly, by the
parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.”98

93. See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: United States and India: Strategic
Partnership, supra note 30.
94. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 151.
95. Id. at 153.
96. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 14.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
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This broadly stated obligation is indicative of the drafters’ intention to
encourage not only multilateral accord on the issue of non-proliferation,
but cooperative and collective efforts to prevent their development in any
subject territory.99 Consistent with this vision, article 7 establishes an
international organ known as the Agency for Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America that is comprised of representatives of the
contracting parties.100 The General Conference is the Agency’s supreme
decision-making organ and its decisions relating to procedural and substantive obligations under the agreement are binding on the contacting
parties. Perhaps the most powerful expression of multilateralism displacing state sovereignty is the “special inspections” provision under article
16.101 It provides for either the IAEA to conduct an inspection in accordance with safeguards agreements or for the Council (a body of five representatives elected by the General Conference) to request a special inspection when there is reason to suspect some proscribed activity by or
on behalf of a contracting party.102
All thirty-three Latin American countries are parties to this treaty.103 In
addition, as a signatory of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty, the
United States has agreed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the contracting parties.104 Thus, the Tlatelolco Treaty undeniably
expresses solidarity of the Latin American states in their adherence to
non-proliferation. Coupled with the endorsement by the United States as
99. Such a purpose can be gleaned from clause 12 of the Preamble, which reads,
“That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free
from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both in their own interests and for the good of mankind. . . .” Id. at 522.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 527.
102. Id. Article 24 of the Tlatelolco Treaty contains a compromise clause accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the event of a dispute
between the Parties. Id. at 530.
103. Adam Shapiro, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones- The Solution to Nuclear Disarmament?, UN CHRONICLE ONLINE EDITION, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/web
Articles/081204_nwfz.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
104. Understandably in light of the Cold War context in which this was signed, this
promise is qualified by the caveat that, “the United States would have to consider an
armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State,
would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under
Article I of the Treaty.” Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
Its Status and the Status of Additional Protocols I and II, May 2, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1404,
1420. See also Additional Protocol I, which imposes a duty on non-Latin American signatory states to enforce the articles of the Treaty in territories under their de jure or de
facto control that fall within the territorial scope of the treaty. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra
note 14, 6 I.L.M. at 533.
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a Protocol II signatory, this arrangement would tend to demonstrate the
superior legal authority and influence a multilateral framework provides.
2. The South Pacific Treaty of Rarotonga105
In 1985, the thirteen independent states comprising the South Pacific
Forum adopted an arguably more ambitious substantive approach in prohibiting nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices in general.106
Unlike the Tlatelolco Treaty, which makes an allowance for peaceful
nuclear explosions under article 18, Rarotonga expressly renounces nuclear explosions of any kind in several places throughout the treaty.107
With respect to decision-making authority, under annex 3 the Rarotonga
establishes the Consultative Committee, which is the Tlatelolco Council’s counterpart. It is charged with reviewing complaints by parties and
where necessary appointing “suitably qualified inspectors” who will report on any alleged breaches, triggering a consultative meeting of the
contracting parties.108 Finally, the Rarotonga is furnished with Additional
Protocol II, which invites the five NWSs to undertake not to use or
threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against parties to the
treaty.109 As of June 20, 2002 all the invitees except the United States
had ratified this Protocol.110
The differential treatment afforded the Rarotonga NWFZ as opposed to
the Tlatelolco is indicative of the realist policy approach Washington
employs in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. By ratifying the “nonuse” protocol for Latin America with the Cold War as a backdrop, the
United States was subsuming the American continents under its nuclear
umbrella and avoiding their co-option by the former Soviet Union. This
same treatment is denied to the South Pacific NWFZ despite its adherence to even higher legal standards of nuclear abstinence and despite the
remaining four nuclear powers assuring “non-use” through ratification.
105. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 14.
106. The thirteen contracting states: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New
Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and
Vanuatu. Adam Shapiro, supra note 103.
107. See Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 14, 24 I.L.M. at 1444 (art. 1(c) reads: “‘nuclear explosive device’ means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of
releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose. . . .”) (emphasis added). Also of
interest are article 3 (Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices), article 5 (Prevention
of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices), and article 6 (Prevention of Testing Nuclear
Explosive Devices). Id. at 1444–46.
108. Id. at 1456.
109. Id. at 1461.
110. Status of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, http://www.opanal.org/
NWFZ/Rarotonga/rarotonga.htm (on file with author).
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In this case, the U.S. approach is an inconsistent recognition of the value
of NWFZ to the non-proliferation regime and detracts from the coherence of the underlying principles informing such instruments.111 This
ultimately undermines the compliance-pull of NWFZ from the perspective of other NWSs.
3. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (“ABMT”)112
The ABMT was a bilateral mutual assurance agreement between the
former Soviet Union and the United States that sought to restrain the defensive arms race between the two nations with the ultimate intended
effect of stymieing the strategic offensive arms race.113 Under the treaty,
each party undertakes to limit its development and deployment of antiballistic missile (“ABM”) systems and promises to refrain from deploying such systems in the air, sea, space, or through mobile land-based
technology.114 Article III allows for an exception whereby each country
can employ ABM systems covering two limited areas, the capital and
another 150 kilometer radius of its choosing.115 The treaty’s design is
indicative of the unique bipolar paradigm that was the Cold War and
therefore should not be criticized for its lack of multilateralism.116 What
is material to this discussion, however, is the reactionary nature of U.S
non-proliferation policy, which tends to write-off extant legal obligations
for the sake of short-term offensive strategic advantages.
On December 13, 2001, three months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration executed what it had been
planning well before the attacks: citing the emergent security context
111. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 174.
112. ABMT, supra note 12.
113. Id. See also Hillary A. Smith, Is Honesty Still the Best Policy: Considering Legal
Options for Missile Defense and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 199, 202 (2002) (discussing the underlying principle of Mutually Assured Destruction
(“MAD”) as the cornerstone of the ABM treaty; explaining that a missile-defense system
would remove the nuclear-stalemate, enabling one party to counter a retaliatory counterattack, thereby reviving an incentive to develop more destructive offensive weapons).
114. ABMT, supra note 12, at 3439, 3441.
115. In 1976, the Treaty was amended by a Protocol, which further restricted the number of zones each Party could protect with ABM systems, required that each country
choose either to protect its capital or the alternative region provided for under article III,
and dismantle the alternate with notice to the other Party. Limitation of Anti-ballistic
Missile Systems, Protocol to the Treaty of May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974, 27
U.S.T. 1645.
116. Richard L. Williamson, Hard Law, Softlaw, And Non-Law In Multilateral Arms
Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 64–65 (2003) (positing that
“[b]ilateral nuclear arms control is virtually synonymous with the unique case of arms
control between the US and the Soviet Union” given the high probability of MAD).
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involving “terrorists” and “rogue states”, it unilaterally announced the
irrelevance of the ABMT and withdrew from the instrument.117 In light
of this changed circumstance, the United States argued, Russia was no
longer its primary national security concern and therefore, its obligations
owed to Russia under the ABMT were without purpose.118 Needless to
say, Russia was strongly opposed to this position and emphasized the
vital role the ABMT plays in the larger non-proliferation regime.119
While relations between the two states have significantly improved from
the constant state of enmity that prevailed before the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R., beginning in 2001 with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABMT,
there are indications that U.S. policy has emboldened Russia to increase
its potency, albeit selectively, as a nuclear power.120
Though the only parties to the treaty were the United States and Russia, the broader community of states considered the withdrawal as a significant threat to international security.121 Not the least of these concerned states was China, given that a United States equipped with an effective missile defense system would nullify the nuclear deterrent value
of its own arsenal, thereby, perhaps justifiably, provoking it to abandon

117. John R. Burroughs, Jonathan Granoff, John H. Harrington, Bonnie D. Jenkins,
Barry Kellman & Mark S. Zaid, Arms Control and National Security, 36 INT’L LAW 471,
497 (2001) (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, President Discusses National Missile Defense,
Remarks by George W. Bush, President, The Rose Garden, Washington D.C. (Dec. 13,
2001)). See also First Committee, Closer to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, UN
CHRONICLE ONLINE EDITION, ¶¶ 10–11, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2000/issue4/
0400p32.htm (citing arguments made by U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Robert Gray at the
NPT Review Conference in April 2000) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
118. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117.
119. Id. at 499 (citing ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Russian Statements on U.S. Missile Defense Plans, Oct. 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/russianmd.asp).
120. See Christine Kucia, Russia Mulls Altered Nuclear Doctrine, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION, Nov. 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Russiannuclear
doctrine.asp (discussing Russia’s announcement of its intention to “rejuvenate[]” its land
based nuclear-weapons arsenal in order to secure a satisfactory deterrent level for thirty
years). Despite this apparent push towards nuclear weapons development, Russia and the
United States signed another bilateral measure in 2002. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (“SORT”), or “Moscow Treaty,” provided that each country would, “cut
their deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads each—approximately a
two-thirds reduction from current levels.” Philipp C. Bleek, U.S., Russia Sign Treaty
Cutting Deployed Nuclear Forces, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, June 2002, http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/sortjune02.asp. See also The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 24, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 799.
121. Burroughs, supra note 117, at 499 (citing the Final Document of the 2000 NPT
Review Conference where NPT states view the ABMT as being “a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions of strategic weapons).
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its own commitments under the NPT.122 Here again, one witnesses the
myopic realist calculations of the Pentagon and the White House defining non-proliferation policies and having the ultimate effect of eroding
international faith in the control regimes.
4. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”)123
President Clinton lauded the CTBT as an essential and pivotal step towards realizing global non-proliferation and disarmament.124 Because
testing of nuclear technology is a necessary procedure in the sound development of nuclear weapons systems, a complete ban on testing would
effectively halt significant advances in arms development.125 Under its
basic obligations, the CTBT requires parties to refrain from conducting
or participating in any nuclear explosive tests and to adopt domestic laws
prohibiting the same.126 The CTBT opened for signature on September
24, 1996.127 President Clinton was the first head of state to sign the
Treaty.128 On October 13, 1999, the Senate declined to give its advice
and consent to the CTBT,129 making it the first arms control treaty to be
rejected by the Senate in eighty years.130 As of September 2007, 177
122. Id. See also Paul Kerr, China Stresses Common Approach With Bush Administration’s Non-proliferation Policy, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Jan./Feb. 2004,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/China.asp (discussing the shift in tone of
Beijing’s policy on nuclear non-proliferation released in a white paper expressing criticism against the U.S. pursuit of a missile defense system, leaving unaddressed goals of
disarmament, and stressing multilateral, peaceful measures for achieving nonproliferation goals).
123. CTBT, supra note 13.
124. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 490 (citing Press Release, White House,
Remarks by the President to the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(Sept. 22, 1997)).
125. Sarah Elizabeth Kreps and Anthony Clark Arend, Why States Follow the Rules:
Toward a Positional Theory of Adherence to International Regimes, 16 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 331, 355 (Spring 2006). See also Masahiko Asada, CTBT: Legal Questions Arising from Its Non-Entry-Into-Force, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 85, 88 (2002).
126. CTBT, supra note 13, at 1444.
127. The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Apr. 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ctbtsig.
asp.
128. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 489.
129. The defeat was brought about by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight. Id.
130. Id. See also Craig Cerniello, Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:
Clinton Vows to Continue Moratorium, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Sept./Oct. 1999,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99.asp. In the wake of the Senate’s
rejection of the CTBT, the Clinton administration not only vowed to observe its moratorium on testing but seemed to allude to this course of action as one arising out of a sense
of legal obligation as a signatory to the CTBT. See Asada, supra note 125 at 96 (citing
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countries had signed the treaty and 140 countries had ratified.131 The
CTBT will come into force only when forty-four countries designated as
“nuclear capable” have signed and ratified the treaty.132 Of those countries, thirty-four have ratified but India, Pakistan, and North Korea, also
required states, have not signed.133
The strict entry-into-force clause of the CTBT indicates the absolute
necessity for “nuclear-capable” states to be bound by such an instrument
in order to ensure a stable legal foundation for non-proliferation.134 Another factor, which may explain the stringent entry-into-force requirement, is the CTBT’s robust verification regime, which includes an international monitoring system (“IMS”) and allows for on-site inspections
(“OSI”).135 The IMS envisions monitoring facilities placed in approximately ninety countries throughout the world that are administered and
operated by a host country in collaboration with the CTBT Organization
(“CTBTO”) to monitor signals underground, underwater, and aboveground.136 The OSI provision contains a liberal procedure by which a
state party suspicious of a nuclear test may request an on-site inspection
based on information gathered by either the IMS and/or “any relevant
technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law . . . .”137 Furthermore, there is no exhaustion requirement
obliging the complaining state to pursue consultation or clarification with
the party under suspicion.138
Given the lofty ambitions of this instrument, it would behoove the
United States, as the world’s most prominent advocate of nonproliferation, to ensure the survival and success of the CTBT. In the

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s statement professing U.S. intentions to abide by
its obligations, “as a signatory under international law,” in The Imperial Presidency,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999).
131. The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, supra note 127.
132. Id. (listing the necessary ratifications).
133. Id.
134. In fact, as Asada pointedly remarks, “the CTBT is redundant for the non-nuclearweapon states party to the NPT, which have already been prohibited from possessing
nuclear weapons in the first place, let alone conducting testing on them.” Asada, supra
note 125, at 87.
135. CTBT, supra note 13, at 1458.
136. In contrast, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 “only prohibited nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and under water” and relied solely upon national
technical means of verification administered unilaterally. Asada, supra note 125, at 89–
90.
137. CTBT, supra note 13, 1449.
138. Asada, supra note 125, at 91.
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wake of the Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999, one could at least
argue that the Clinton administration’s assurances to remain loyal to the
spirit of the CTBT demonstrated good faith in accordance with article VI
of the NPT.139 In addition, Asada argues that mere signatories to a treaty
may derive a legal obligation from customary international law to refrain
from acts that would defeat the purpose of the instrument.140 In this vein,
the United States, under the direction of the Bush administration has
thrown the viability of the CTBT into serious question whilst ignoring its
obligations under international law.
Contemplating the difficulties that would inhere in attaining fullfledged legal enforcement of the treaty, the drafters of the CTBT provided for intermittent conferences under article XIV.141 This provision
allows a majority of ratifying states to call a conference in order to consider measures that could further progress towards entry-into-force.142 A
majority of ratifying states called such a conference in November of
2001.143 Although the conference is convened by ratifying states, under
paragraph 4 of article XIV, signatories are invited to attend as observers.144 The United States declined to attend the conference at the United
Nations, sending ripples of disappointment throughout the international
community.145 This reaffirmed the Bush administration’s previous declarations that it would not resubmit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification.146 In contrast, China, also a non-ratifying signatory, attended the
139. Article VI of the NPT reads, “Each of the Parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T.
at 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 170.
140. Asada, supra note 125, at 98.
141. CTBT, supra note 13, at 1457.
142. Id. The first conference was held in Vienna from October 6–8, 1999 in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XIV calling for the first conference three years after
the adoption of the treaty in the case it had not entered into force. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 491.
143. Philipp C. Bleek, UN Conference Shows Support For Test Ban; U.S. Absent,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/
ctbtdec01.asp.
144. CTBT, supra note 13, 35 I.L.M. at 1457.
145. So overt was the recalcitrance of the United States that U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. John Negroponte, was quoted as saying, “We’re just not going to engage.” Bleek,
supra note 143, ¶ 4. See Daryl G. Kimball, CTBT Rogue State?, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/ctbtanalysisdec01.asp
(describing, in detail, the unilateralist pattern of the Bush administration in dealing with
non-proliferation and the reactions by concerned states).
146. Bleek, supra note 143. See also Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 492.
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2001 conference, once again demonstrating the conspicuous reluctance
of the United States to embrace multilateralism.147 Moreover, the U.S.
failure to support this conference and its refusal to resume ratification
procedures domestically can be viewed as breaches of its duty to negotiate in good faith under article VI of the NPT and its duty to avoid acts
that defeat the purpose of the treaty under customary international law.148
Finally, the United States compounds the inconsistencies in its nonproliferation record by partially funding the CTBT Preparatory Commission.149 The CTBT provides for a preparatory commission (“PrepCom”)
that envisions that the aforementioned IMS and OSI programs will be
functional upon the entry-into-force of the CTBT.150 In March of 2002,
in its proposed budget for the 2003 fiscal year, the Bush administration
requested from Congress funding in the amount of $18.2 million to support the development of the IMS only.151 This selective endorsement of
one aspect of the CTBT, while arguably an overture consistent with the
goals of non-proliferation, has been received by many states with uneasiness given the conflicting interest of the Bush administration in pursuing
low-yield nuclear weapons.152 On balance, in light of Thomas Franck’s
theory of legitimacy as a function of coherence, the inconsistency of U.S.
policy vis-à-vis the CTBT cultivates an atmosphere of unpredictability.
This in turn will inevitably discourage other key states (a state most pertinent to our discussion, India), whose ratification is required for entryinto-force, to abstain from ratification and threaten the very survival of
the treaty itself.
India’s treatment of the CTBT has been consistent with its historical
blend of principled criticism of and willingness to engage with the nonproliferation regime. India’s criticism of the CTBT came primarily during the negotiations over its text in the 1996 Conference on Disarmament
(“CD”) in Geneva, where it vetoed the full text of the CTBT.153 Later, a
147. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 491.
148. The latter argument would follow given that the failure of the United States to
ratify would preclude the entry into force of the CTBT, thereby relieving all ratifying
states from the basic textual duty to abstain from testing.
149. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 116, at 492.
150. Asada, supra note 125, at 104.
151. News Briefs, Bush Requests Funds for CTBT Monitoring, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION, Mar. 2002, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/briefsmarch02.asp#
ctbt.
152. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 491. The uneasiness is justified if one considers the amount of leverage the United States will have over the international monitoring system by funding it, all the while remaining a party not bound by the treaty’s obligations.
153. Asada, supra note 125, at 86.
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U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopted the text and opened it for
signature despite dissenting votes from India, Libya, and Bhutan.154
Given India’s nuclear tests, which would follow in 1998, India’s resistance to the CTBT’s adoption is readily explained.155 After its successful
tests, however, facing sanctions by the United States, India voiced its
willingness to sign the CTBT in exchange for a lifting of sanctions and
unilaterally declared a moratorium on testing.156 To date, India has not
signed the CTBT, most likely taking its cue from the United States’ failure to ratify the same. Therefore, the U.S.-India agreement as it stands
would allow India to escape commitments it made after its nuclear tests.
Because by the terms of the agreement all that is required of India is that
it maintain its moratorium on testing, the deal overlooks India’s additional responsibility of signing the CTBT pursuant to its assurances following the 1998 tests.
The foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate the primacy of
multilateralism as a followed custom in the realm of non-proliferation
and the inconsistency with which the United States has pursued its policies on the same. The United States often sacrifices legal coherence for
the sake of perceived strategic advantages. The U.S.-India Strategic Partnership is another manifestation of this behavior that will undoubtedly
detract from the non-proliferation regime’s coherence and consequently,
its legitimacy. Alternatively, the partnership can have the effect of bringing into question the legally permissible conduct of a NWS with respect
to a state that is not a party to any nuclear arms control instrument. In
Franck’s words, the agreement can undermine the regime’s determinacy
by clouding the scope of acceptable behavior, thereby raising the specter
of other nuclear capable countries trading freely in nuclear technology
with unbound states.157

154. Steve Andreasen, Book Review: Treaty and Tragedy—The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider’s Perspective by Keith A. Hansen, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION, May 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_05/bookreview.asp.
155. Id.
156. Howard Diamond, India, Pakistan Commit to Sign CTB Treaty by September
1999, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Oct. 1998, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_10
/ipoc98.asp (citing statements made by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the
United Nations in September of 1998, four months after the Indian tests).
157. FRANCK, supra note 16.
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B. The U.S.-India Deal Threatens the Non-Proliferation Regime’s Determinacy thereby Inducing State Behavior Injurious to the Regime’s
Goals
According to Franck, a rule’s compliance pull is largely dependent on
its determinacy or elasticity.158 The more a rule is susceptible to several
conflicting interpretations, the easier it becomes to justify noncompliance.159 This also may be an indication that the drafters and architects of the rule themselves were at odds on what kinds of behavior they
were setting out to cultivate.160 The NPT certainly exhibits such elasticity
and one may intuit that its drafters deliberately sought to preserve flexibility for the future.161 However, as discussed in Part II.A above, the
broader non-proliferation regime has evolved since the adoption of the
NPT in favor of oversight and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes through multilateral institutions. This Part will argue that 1) the
justifications being proffered by the United States in support of its nuclear partnership with India stand in direct opposition to the regime’s
expected patterns of behavior and 2) if these justifications are accepted
and endorsed by the several states comprising the regime, what little progress has been made towards crystallization of a more determinate rule
of non-proliferation will be squandered away.
In order to understand the irony of the U.S. proposed nuclear partnership with India, it is important to recall that the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(“NSG”) must, by consensus, approve the deal, thereby excepting India
from its policy requiring recipient states 1) to be parties to the NPT and
2) to apply full-scope IAEA safeguards, i.e., oversight on all their peaceful nuclear activities.162 Because India already has military nuclear facilities and will essentially choose those that it designates as “civil,” the
comprehensive scope intended by IAEA’s language is thwarted. The
NSG was created following India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974
when it became apparent that nuclear materials transferred for peaceful

158. Id. at 54.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 53.
161. Id. at 54. The ambivalence of the NPT’s drafters is enshrined in the tension between articles I and II of the treaty prohibiting transfer or receipt of nuclear weapons
related technology and article IV, which encourages transfer of nuclear technology for
“peaceful purposes.” NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 488–89, 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166–
67, 170.
162. Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for
the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, supra note 33; See also
IAEA, The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities, INFCIRC/539/
Rev.3 at 5, May 30, 2005 [hereinafter NSG Origins].
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purposes could be invidiously diverted for use in weapons production.163
Currently, the NSG consortium is comprised of forty-five states that represent the nuclear suppliers of the world.164 In 1978, the NSG published
guidelines that incorporated a “Trigger List” of items that would trigger
the requirement for full-scope IAEA safeguards as a precondition for
transfer to a non-NWS of materials that could directly contribute to
weapons production.165 Shortly after 1990, Iraq presented a new dilemma
to NSG through its clandestine weapons program. Iraq sought to procure
lower-level dual-use items not covered by the guidelines and then, “to
build its own Trigger-List materials.”166 This prompted the NSG to adopt
separate dual-use guidelines in 1992 that generally prohibit the transfer
of certain agreed upon dual-use items when there is an “unacceptable
risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to
the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”167
In light of this obvious movement towards thorough risk assessment of
nuclear weapons proliferation by the world’s major multilateral organ
representing nuclear suppliers, the U.S.-India nuclear partnership would
cast the legitimacy and integrity of the institution into serious doubt
should the NSG approve the arrangement. Throughout its history, the
NSG has sought to balance accessibility to nuclear technology with the
interests of achieving full-scope safeguards on any recipient country’s
fuel-cycle.168 As it stands now, the envisioned U.S. agreement with India
would not require it to bring all its nuclear facilities under the auspices of

163. See Milhollin, supra note 69. See also Communications Received from Certain
Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technology, supra note 33, at 5.
164. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. NSG Origins, supra note 162, at 14.
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id. at 6.
167. International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Received from Certain
Member States Regarding Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, Mar. 20,
2006, at 4. Dual-use technology is generally defined as a broad array technology that can
be employed in military uses as well as nonviolent civil applications (e.g., software,
semiconductors, machine tools, etc.). Antonia Alice Badway, Controlling the Export of
Dual-Use Technology in a Post-9/11 World, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 431, 432 (2005).
168. NSG Origins, supra note 162, at 6.
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the IAEA.169 Nevertheless, the Bush administration has adamantly defended the partnership with India as consistent with the principles of
non-proliferation and maintains that, if anything, the partnership will enhance the non-proliferation regime by bringing two-thirds of India’s civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.170 In her address to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 5, 2006, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice responded to concerns that India has yet to sign the
NPT:
We have to recognize that the NPT is the cornerstone, but one part of a
maturing non-proliferation framework in which we are also working to
have rules of the game that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has on certain
standards of behavior. India is agreeing to adhere to those unilaterally.171

This statement is absolutely misleading since India has not agreed to
the standards of behavior promulgated by the NSG and in fact, the NSG
must exempt it from the heretofore essential precondition of FSS. Moreover, according to one representative for the Department of State who
specializes in Indian affairs, Katherine Schultz, it is highly improbable
that India will ever agree to full-scope safeguards.172 Even the limited
partial-safeguard pledge that India made as part of the agreement has
proven to be less than forthcoming.173 Understandably then, following a
confidential presentation by Indian officials on October 12, 2006 in front

169. Bernard Gwertzman, Interview with Lawrence Scheinman: New U.S.-India
Agreement Undercuts U.S. Allegiance to Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9149/
scheinman.html?breadcrumb=default (Scheinman, an arms control expert, explains that
India has agreed to separate its civilian nuclear facilities from its military facilities and
bring the civilian ones under IAEA safeguards. However, it is India’s sovereign right to
deem as it chooses what it considers civilian versus military facilities. How it makes this
decision depends on its strategic policy of minimum deterrence which can change with
circumstances.).
170. David Shelby, Rice Urges Congress to Support India Civil Nuclear Cooperation,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Apr. 5, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Apr/05767496.html.
171. Id.
172. Schultz Interview, supra note 30.
173. “New Delhi has repeatedly stated that Washington must change U.S. law before
India takes steps to fulfill its side of the deal.” Wade Boese, Senate Vote on U.S.-Indian
Deal Delayed, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Oct. 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
2006_10/USIndia.asp. Interestingly enough, in order to assuage concerns in Congress,
Secretary of State Rice said, “that the administration has pressed India to move ahead in
its discussions with the IAEA and said the U.S. legislative changes could not take effect
until the IAEA safeguards are in place.” Shelby, supra note 170.
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of the NSG, two NSG member officials expressed skepticism as to the
reliability of India’s assurances.174
All this uncertainty surrounding the U.S.-India proposal raises the
question: why force such a sweeping exception through a fragile control
system that is just recently becoming enmeshed in international law? One
obvious albeit simplistic response is money. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce has estimated that the deal can generate $100 billion in energy sales for U.S. companies.175 Ron Somers, President of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce’s U.S.-India Business Council, fears that if the
United States does not feed India’s growing demand for nuclear energy,
competitors such as France, Canada, and Germany will capture that market, resulting in major losses for U.S. companies.176 This economic reasoning, however, fails to take into account the fate of the legal regime
governing transfer of nuclear technology. Recalling Franck’s theory of
determinacy, it can reasonably be said that the NSG’s categorical requirement of full-scope safeguards is a clear rule outlining behavior expected of states. It should follow that states are less willing to ignore this
rule for the sake of short term instant gratification in the interest of pursuing long-term communitarian goals.177 Therefore, if the NSG itself approves the exception for India and allows the U.S.-India deal to go
through, it would implicitly endorse the troubling behavior of pursuing
economic gains at the expense of ensuring non-proliferation. Even now,
while NSG’s stamp of approval is pending, the moral hazard that the deal
presents to the rest of the nuclear-capable states is palpable. China, for its
part, has already “grandfathered” certain technology transfer agreements
it made with Pakistan.178 Scheinman’s fear is that other countries will

174. Wade Boese, Nuclear Suppliers Updated on U.S.-Indian Deal, ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION, Nov. 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NucSuppliers.asp.
175. Mathewson, supra note 29.
176. The U.S.-India Business Council represents companies such as General Electric
Co. and Westinghouse Electric Co., which are ready to supply India with nuclear equipment. Id.
177. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 57.
178. Gwertzman, supra note 169. China is widely recognized as being a critical factor
in Pakistan’s attainment of nuclear-weapons capability. See Federation of American Scientists, Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html (“In the past, China played a
major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to
acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense
report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided
critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.”) (last visited Mar.
10, 2008).
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also see Pakistan (not to mention other similarly situated states such as
Israel) as a lucrative business opportunity and transfer sensitive technologies to it without ensuring comprehensive safeguards.179 This fear is
not unfounded as it has become clear that Russia, Britain, France, and
Australia have all spoken out in favor of this agreement.180
In conclusion, should the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement reach
fruition with the blessing of the NSG, it would undermine the determinacy of the non-proliferation regime thereby inducing widespread noncompliance. This result will naturally follow since the agreement creates
a moral hazard for other states to pursue similar arrangements with the
aim of realizing short term monetary gains while forgoing long-term collective goals of non-proliferation that have heretofore been of primary
importance to the NSG and the international community at large.
III. THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP THREATENS AN UNSTABLE PEACE
It is beyond the scope of this Note to provide a detailed outline of the
events giving rise to the historical animosity between India and Pakistan.181 The purpose of this Part is simply to frame the U.S.-India nuclear
partnership within the seemingly intractable discord between India and
179. Gwertzman, supra note 169 (In her interview, Scheinman elaborates, “to the extent that [the United States is] making those transfers, [it is] relieving [India] of the need
to produce [its] own material for [its] civil programs domestically and the workload that
would have gone into producing that civil nuclear material could, in theory, be dedicated
to producing nuclear material for weapons purposes. So, in a sense, [the United States]
would be assisting [India] in [its] proliferation.”).
180. Statement of R. Nicholas Burns, Under Sec’y of State for Political Affairs, U.S.India Civil Nuclear Agreement: Foreign Press Center Briefing, March 22, 2006,
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/63542.htm.
181. Beginning with the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, India and Pakistan have
been at odds with each other, primarily contesting domain over the territory of Kashmir, a
state that is now under India’s control. The first war between the two states took place in
1947 when it was sparked by Muslim separatists in Kashmir. India agreed to support the
then Maharaja (provincial ruler) of Kashmir against the insurgency in exchange for the
state’s accession into the Indian Union. The validity of that accession has been challenged by Pakistan as well as Kashmiri separatists. The next significant clash came in
1971 when a civil war in East Pakistan provoked India to support the East Pakistani rebels against the armies of West Pakistan. Shortly after India’s intervention, East Pakistan
became an independent state now known as Bangladesh. Subsequently, frequent armed
disturbances erupted in Kashmir, provoking India to blame Pakistan for staging a protracted proxy war on its territory. After the 1998 nuclear tests of India and then Pakistan,
1999 saw another armed conflict erupt when India launched an armed attack against
Pakistani-backed forces that had infiltrated Kashmir. A massive troop build-up along the
border threatened the onset of a full-scale war. Most recently, a similar situation was
precipitated when Islamic militants attacked the Indian Parliament in 2001. See IndiaPakistan: Troubled Relations, supra note 18.
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Pakistan and to once again emphasize the importance of legal regimes in
cultivating transparency, compliance, and predictable behavior. It will be
argued that the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm, in which collective action
is often improbable given the strong incentive to cheat for individual
gains, is all the more true in the case of India and Pakistan, given their
acrimonious past.182 Second, because there is no binding regional pact
that obliges the states to abstain from nuclear weapons proliferation and
because no agreement subjects Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to IAEA
safeguards, history counsels that the most probable outcome is increased
proliferation by Pakistan. Therefore, absent a broader arrangement that
brings Pakistan’s facilities under safeguards, the U.S.-India deal will
more than likely have the unintended effect of accelerating proliferation
in the region.
The standard prisoner’s dilemma model envisions players who must
decide only one move, where the choice is between a collective scenario
promising a desirable outcome for all, a selfish scenario where cheating
while others cooperate maximizes individual gain, and a worst-case scenario where everyone cheats and the group suffers a substantial joint
penalty.183 In this setting, the theory proposes that each player has two
logically distinct incentives to defect, i.e., cheat.184 On the one hand,
there is an “offensive incentive” to defect because a player can realize
the best individual outcome while the other cooperates. Conversely, there
is a “defensive incentive” to defect in order for a player to avoid being on
the receiving end of an offensive defection, i.e., to avoid the “sucker’s
payoff” by unilateral cooperation.185
Before proceeding with this line of analysis, it is necessary to establish
what legal regime India and Pakistan would be complying with or defecting from. The simple truth of the matter is that neither state is a party to
any international arms agreement circumscribing its right to expand its
nuclear arsenal. The only relevant treaty binding both parties that arguably limits their ability to proliferate in one narrow respect is the 1963
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space, and Under Water.186 Popularly known as the Limited Test Ban
Treaty (“LTBT”), the agreement prohibits states from conducting nuclear
test explosions in the atmosphere, outer-space or underwater, including
182. Abbott, supra note 22, at 16.
183. Id. at 7 (providing a chart that explains various outcomes of the game).
184. Id. at 8.
185. Id.
186. Billy Merck, International Law and the Nuclear Threat in Kashmir: A Proposal
for a U.S. Led Resolution to the Dispute Under UN Authority, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
167, 176 (2004).
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territorial waters or high seas.187 This treaty did not in any way inhibit
either country from conducting underground nuclear tests in 1998. Since
those tests, however, both India and Pakistan have declared unilateral
moratoriums on nuclear tests that can potentially be regarded as conduct
arising out of a legal obligation.188 Both states assumed this policy stance
in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests, which had provoked the United
States to impose sanctions.189 The sanctions were promptly waived just
six months after the tests when the leaders of India and Pakistan expressed a commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT and adherence
to their moratorium pledges.190 While India went as far as acknowledging
the possibility of a legal obligation prohibiting further tests, Pakistan
cited the pendency of the CTBT and pledged to refrain from tests,
“unless another extraordinary event” proved inimical to its security interests.191 The last possible source of legal obligation restricting the conduct
of both states is the Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), signed on February 21, 1999.192 These instruments
commit both states to abide by their unilateral testing moratoriums, compel both states to engage in confidence building measures, and require
them to adopt national policies that reduce the risks of a nuclear exchange.193

187. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
188. Alex Wagner, India Reaffirms its CTBT Policy, Pakistan Follows, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Oct. 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_10/indpakoct
00.asp (reporting that both India and Pakistan committed to voluntary moratoriums on
nuclear tests, pledged not to block the entry-into-force of the CTBT, and India expressed
the willingness to convert its voluntary moratorium into a de jure obligation). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
102(1)(a), cmt. b (1987) (“a practice initially followed by states as a matter of courtesy or
habit may become law when states generally come to believe that they are under a legal
obligation to comply with it”).
189. Howard Diamond, U.S. Waives Many Test-Related Sanctions on India, Pakistan,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Nov./Dec. 1998, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_1112/ipnd98.asp.
190. Id.
191. Wagner, supra note 188 (quoting Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar at a
news conference held on September 25, 2000).
192. Lahore Declaration between India and Pakistan, EMBASSY OF INDIA, Feb. 21,
1999, http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/lahoredeclaration.html; Memorandum of Understanding in Lahore, EMBASSY OF INDIA, Feb. 21, 1999,
http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/mou(lahore01211999).html.
193. One such confidence building measure is the requirement that a state notify the
other of a forthcoming ballistic missile test so as to avoid misunderstandings that can lead
to an armed conflict. Memorandum of Understanding in Lahore, supra note 192.
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Provided with this very tenuous legal framework, it is clear that the
U.S.-India deal serves to exacerbate both the offensive incentive for India to defect as well as the defensive incentive for Pakistan to defect.194
On the one hand, India would now enjoy liberalized trade in nuclear material and be tempted to gain a marked advantage over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, thereby defusing Pakistan’s deterrence value.195 This is especially likely in the case of India if one subscribes to Abbott’s assertion
that “offensive defection is largely a problem of inadequate information.”196 Since India will not be subject to full-scope safeguards on its
nuclear facilities, one can presume inadequate information. Therefore,
the need for a more robust verification scheme at least between Pakistan
and India should be a primary objective for the United States if it
chooses to proceed with the nuclear partnership with India.
On the other hand, faced with a history of India’s aggressive behavior
in nuclear proliferation, Pakistan would fear the “sucker’s payoff” and
would be induced to expand its nuclear arsenal.197 If the immediate diplomatic reaction of a state is any indication of how it will conduct itself
in the not-too-distant future, then it is not insignificant that Pakistan cancelled the diplomatic visit of its Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, to the
United States after the announcement of the India-U.S. nuclear partnership.198 Moreover, Pakistan’s primary concern is in fact what the prisoner’s dilemma envisions as outlined above, i.e., the lack of adequate
information and the need for verification. Pakistan is primarily concerned
with the possibility that India can now produce increased quantities of
weapons-grade material in its unsafeguarded facilities.199 The National
Command Authority, Pakistan’s nuclear authority, ominously declared,
“In view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce
significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un194. Here it is worthy of mention that both states continue to engage in aggressive
weapons posturing with the use of missile-tests that demonstrate their capacity to deliver
warheads. See Rose Gordon, India, Pakistan Trade Tit-for-Tat Missile Tests, ARMS
CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Apr. 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_04/missiletest_
apr03.asp.
195. Abbott, supra note 22, at 16. (“The offensive incentive is an incentive of temptation. It leads parties to cheat or shirk on their commitments in ways they hope will not be
observed, rather than to withdraw from those commitments altogether. . . .”).
196. Id.
197. Id. (“Concern over offensive defection will also be strong when the overall relationship between the parties is one of suspicion-based on reputation or prior experienceor unfamiliarity.”).
198. Sridhar, supra note 20.
199. Indo Asian News Service, Pakistan Nuclear Authority Concerned over US-India
Deal, supra note 20.
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safeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our
credible minimum deterrence requirements would be met[] . . . .”200
Ignoring these very clear signals emanating from Pakistan, the United
States is emphasizing the benefit of having India’s civil nuclear facilities
(the ones it designates as civil) under IAEA safeguards. Responding to a
question that raised the issue of Pakistan’s security concerns, Under Secretary of Political Affairs Nicholas Burns was quoted as saying,
this arrangement between the United States and India is good for all of
the countries of South Asia, including Pakistan, because India’s nuclear
program, civil nuclear program, which has been outside of international
supervision, outside of international safeguards for 30 years, is now going to come into international safeguards and the IAEA is going to
place safeguards on fully three-quarters of India’s program. That ought
to be, you would think, an attractive proposition to all the neighbors of
India, including Pakistan.201

However, as the discussion in Part II demonstrated, increasing the accessibility of nuclear materials to India in its civilian programs necessarily frees up nuclear fuel already within its possession for military purposes and Pakistan is keenly aware of this.202 Therefore, India’s promises
amount to mere assurances, which, if relied on by the United States, can
increase the likelihood of offensive defection.203
In conclusion, India’s history of mutual enmity and suspicion with
Pakistan, which to this day remains unresolved largely due to the struggling peace process over Kashmir, makes the U.S.-India nuclear partnership a lightening rod for conflict under the present circumstances. Second, the dearth of legal regimes governing the conduct of either India or
Pakistan in the nuclear weapons realm make the proposition of liberalizing nuclear trade with India highly risky. This is especially the case when
Pakistan’s unilateral moratorium on testing was predicated on the condition that the CTBT entered into force and nothing transpired that would
prove deleterious to its security interests.204 Because the CTBT’s future
is seriously in question after the United States shifted its policy with respect to that instrument, Pakistan’s right to remedy any regional imbalance of power it perceives is legally unfettered. The probability that
Pakistan will pursue this course of action is high given its record of as-

200. Id.
201. R. Nicholas Burns, supra note 180.
202. See Indo-Asian News Service, Pakistan Nuclear Authority Concerned over USIndia Deal, supra note 20.
203. Abbot, supra note 22, at 26.
204. See Wagner, supra note 188.
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piring to match India in military might as well as the principles governing the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm.
CONCLUSION
This Note has set out the legal landscape that the U.S.-India nuclear
partnership confronts. Part I began by explicating the inherent weakness
of the IAEA safeguards system with its allowances for military exemptions and inability to prevent risky transfers before the materials are delivered. This weakness was juxtaposed with India’s historical stance towards non-proliferation and its proclivity to subvert the goals of nonproliferation by feigning cooperation in order to win concessions from
nuclear suppliers, particularly the United States, and ultimately diverting
those concessions to non-peaceful uses. There has been no significant
indication, in legal stance or otherwise, that India will change this behavior.
Part II examined the U.S.-India nuclear partnership in the context of
the broader non-proliferation regime and Franck’s theory of regime legitimacy. It argued that, as a matter of customary international law, states
pursue non-proliferation objectives through multilateral channels or
means not inconsistent with multilateral obligations. Because India is not
a party to any multilateral treaty proscribing its right to expand its nuclear arsenal, the U.S.-India nuclear partnership threatens to undermine
the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime in two ways: 1) as a major
bilateral measure by the United States that is inconsistent with the goals
of non-proliferation, it detracts from the regime’s coherence and 2) if the
relevant multilateral bodies, such as the NSG, accept the agreement as
consistent with the goals of non-proliferation, it undermines the regime’s
determinacy by creating a moral hazard that tempts other supplier nations
to capture markets of nuclear ambitious countries with unsafeguarded
facilities.
Part III briefly described the protracted and easily aggravated tensions
between India and Pakistan, which will only be inflamed by the United
States liberalizing nuclear trade with India. Given the dearth of legal regimes in South Asia governing weapons proliferation, the United States
is relying on India’s assurances that it will exercise restraint in its nuclear
weapons program and hoping that Pakistan’s incentive to proliferate will
be mitigated by bringing India’s civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.205
205. For instance, paragraph (g) of the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act requires India to declare the amount of uranium mined in India during
the previous year, the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for
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For its part, India recently passed a bill promulgating guidelines for
nuclear transfers, amending its own Atomic Energy Act of 1962.206 It
generally adopts a principle of non-proliferation, prohibits export of nuclear technology directed towards development of nuclear weapons, requires IAEA safeguards to apply to any recipient of its exports, and reserves the right to place special controls on sensitive exports as a matter
of national policy.207 As reassuring as this piece of domestic legislation
may be, it is no guarantee that the U.S.-India partnership will avoid the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent. Furthermore, it is
no substitute for legal obligations that emanate from the well established
multilateral non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the foregoing legal considerations taken together lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
U.S.-India Strategic Nuclear Partnership deals a debilitating blow to the
non-proliferation regime.
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